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1. Introduction
The magnitude and the causes of the ﬁnancial market crisis of 2007–2009 have been extensively
described and debated. Our research adds to the literature and examines the impact of a series of gov-
ernmental interventions in response to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009 on the stockholder returns
of banks, Savings and Loans (S&Ls), insurance companies, and REITs. We examine the stock market
reaction to nine economic stimulus interventions and ﬁnancial stability interventions to investigate
whether they increase value and reduce risk for ﬁnancial services ﬁrms. These nine events are selected
because they are not ﬁrm-speciﬁc, but contain ﬁrm-, industry-, and sector-level impacts, and signify
possible linkages between the real estate and ﬁnancial sectors. We investigate whether these gov-
ernment interventions led to differential changes in abnormal returns and systematic risk among
ﬁnancial institutions. While scholars have researched the impact of particular interventions, chieﬂy
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), they have not analyzed the impacts of a broader swath of
interventionswith respect to differential abnormal returns and differential changes in systematic risk.
Our paper ﬁlls this gap.
The primary contribution of our study is that, to our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst to examine the
impact of interventions in a multi-event framework over the 2007–2009 crisis period. The second
important contribution is that, while most studies of the recent ﬁnancial market crisis focus on banks,
we explicitly examine the differential impacts of the interventions on S&Ls, insurance companies, and
REITs as well as banks for changes in both returns and risks. The ﬁnancial crisis is closely linked to
the housing market crisis, a link that provides an opportunity to study how various governmental
interventions impacted other ﬁnancial institutions. Third, we test for ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants of
the differential impact of these interventions.
In response to the ﬁnancial crisis, the U.S. government intervened by taking various measures,
including (a) controversial and expensive economic stimuli, commonly known as the bailout of
the U.S. ﬁnancial system, particularly directed at the banking sector, the insurance industry, and
the housing market; and (b) planned ﬁnancial stability interventions focused on the banking sec-
tor and the housing market. A number of recent studies on the ﬁnancial crisis examine the impact
of the TARP intervention on banks. For instance, Veronesi and Zingales (2010) examine the costs
and beneﬁts of the U.S. government plan that injected preferred equity into nine of the largest
commercial banks in the U.S. Based on a complete wealth analysis using an event study of bonds, pre-
ferred stock, and common equity value around the date of the planned infusion, they conclude that,
though government intervention reduced enterprise value by 2.5%, it also simultaneously reduced
the risk of bankruptcy, which could have resulted in a larger loss of value. In their study of govern-
ment equity infusions and incentives for banks to participate in the TARP Capital Purchase Program
(CPP), Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) note that because CPP infusions took the form of pre-
ferred equity, common equity became more critical in the bank capital structure. In other words,
regulatory interventions in the banking industry may now need to be implemented more quickly
because common equity is the only buffer in the bank’s capital. Therefore, they argue that TARP
may have changed investors’ expectations regarding future governmental interventions (Bayazitova
& Shivdasani, 2012).
Gaby and Walker (2011) discuss the impact of TARP on ﬁnancial institutions by modeling stress
tests that were applied tomajor balance sheet items of the four largest banks. They point out that if all
four of the banks had failed, the loss to the taxpayers would have been enormous. Li (2012) evaluates
the stimulus effects of TARP to examinewhether the capital infusions increased the supply of credit in
the economy during the ﬁnancial crisis. Li notes that while loan supplies increased, banks kept a third
of the TARP monies to support new loans and used the rest to shore up capital. Black and Hazelwood
(2012) examine the impact of TARP on banks’ risk-taking. Their results indicate that the average risk
of loan originations increased for large TARP banks as opposed to non-TARP banks. Further, they ﬁnd
differences in risk-taking behaviorwith large and small banks owing to the conﬂicting objectives given
to TARP banks: to increase lending in a riskier economic period while also increasing bank stability
and reducing incentives to take on excessive risk.
The impact of governmental interventions on insurance companies and REITs has received rela-
tively less attention with regard to this ﬁnancial crisis. Schich (2009) notes that while the solvency
                  
             
             
              
               
               
                
                
                
       
             
               
          
               
           
              
         
           
            
              
           
                
              
              
                  
           
                  
               
               
              
               
                
             
              
               
             
             
            
             
              
               
               
               
                
                  
                 
                   
                  
                  
         
of the insurance sector as a whole did not appear to be in jeopardy, the ﬁnancial crisis had visibly
impacted many insurance companies because of their portfolio structure. He also notes that insur-
ance companies, particularly those in the ﬁnancial guarantee and U.S. mortgage insurance areas, had
investment portfolios that were directly exposed to credit and market risks during the crisis period.
Kocˇovic´, Rakonjac-Antic´, and Jovovic´ (2011), in their study of the impact of the global ﬁnancial crisis
on the scale and structure of insurance company investment portfolios, state that the effects of the
crisis on these portfolios were not apparent until the end of the crisis. Basse, Friedrich, and Vazquez
Bea (2009) ﬁnd that during the crisis, investing in REITs became riskier than investing in some other
ﬁnancial assets. Devaney (2012) examines the SEC ban on short sales during the crisis to ﬁnd increased
event-induced volatility for his sample of 64 REITs.
While these studies provide us with signiﬁcant insights about the single intervention events (such
as the functioning of TARP), the panoply of interventions over 2007–2009 implies the need for a
multi-intervention event study. Reviewing the various governmental interventions, we chose nine
events that we believe largely impacted banks, S&Ls, insurance companies, and REITs.We focus on the
economic stimuli and planned ﬁnancial stability interventions that impacted the housing, banking,
and insurance industries. Details of each event, reasons for its selection, and the expected market
reactions are discussed in the next section of the paper.
The nine interventions studied here have far-reaching implications beyond providing funds for
closing and reorganizing insolvent ﬁnancial institutions because they alter the legal and regula-
tory landscape for the industry. There has been spirited disagreement about the impact of such
measures, particularly the economic stimuli and the regulations that followed.1 By examining the
impact on all four types of institutions, our research adds value to the broader literature on the
impact of regulation on return and risk. According to Kaufman (2010) and Grifﬁths, Kotomin, and
Winters (2011), a through forensic analysis of the ﬁnancial crisis must precede corrective public pol-
icy; this paper is a step in that direction and adds value to the literature on the ﬁnancial market
crisis.
Using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) methodology and the panel regression method, we
examine the stock market reaction of 602 ﬁnancial services ﬁrms as a whole and for each of the four
sub-groups. We ﬁnd that seven of the nine intervention events, on average, have a highly signiﬁcant
negativemarket reaction. Interestingly, the one event that resulted in a positivemarket reaction for all
sub-groups was the October 3, 2008, legislation that passed TARP. Among the industry groups exam-
ined, our results conﬁrm the market perception that the banking industry was the hardest hit during
the crisis.Moreover,weﬁnd that alphas for our sample of ﬁrmsdecrease signiﬁcantly in the post-event
periods, while betas increase. Thus, overall, the interventions decreased value and increased risk for
ﬁnancial institutions as a whole. On the sub-group level, we ﬁnd that the governmental interventions
result in an increase of systematic risk for banks, insurance companies, and REITs. We also examine
the cross-sectional determinants of abnormal stock returns and risk shifts for the ﬁnancial institu-
tions. The cross-sectional results show that leveraged ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher trading volumes
earn signiﬁcantly lower period-abnormal returns, while larger ﬁrms that trade on smaller exchanges
earn higher abnormal returns. We ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms experience increases in systematic risk,
while non-U.S. ﬁrms experience lower changes in systematic risk for both the during- and post-crisis
periods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We describe the background and review the
literature in Section 2, present the research hypothesis in Section 3, describe data and methods in
Section 4, report the empirical results in Section 5, and present our conclusions in Section 6.
1 In March 1999, Alan Greenspan appeared skeptical that the regulations would alleviate the problems facing the ﬁnancial
institutions industry. He states, “[P]ossibility of increased systemic risk does appear to be an issue that requires fuller under-
standing,” arguing that new regulations “would be a major mistake.” (“What created this Monster?” New York Times, March
23, 2008). Further, Mr. Nocera notes that support for regulation surprisingly came from folks such as Rep. Barney Frank, Byron
Wien of Pequot Capital, Laurence Fink of BlackRock, the economist Alan Blinder, Allan Sinai of Decision Economics, Jamie Dimon
of JPMorgan Chase, and “even Larry Kudlow, the archconservative host of Kudlow & Company on CNBC” (“A System Overdue
for Reform,” Joe Nocera, New York Times, March 29, 2008).
    
 
                   
               
                 
                
               
                  
               
               
             
             
               
                
              
               
              
                  
               
      
   
               
              
               
               
             
              
               
          
              
            
             
               
             
              
              
              
             
             
      
  
              
            
             
            
             
             
           
2. Background and literature review
2.1. Background
A crisis in the banking sector, such as the failure of Continental in 1984, the failure of The Bank of
New England in 1991, the 1989 S&L crisis, or the recent 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis, typically results
in loss of public conﬁdence in solvent institutions and loss of liquidity in the troubled bank and the
banking industry. These changes then result in a plunge of stock prices and an increase in systematic
risk for ﬁrms because, as information about the asset quality of banks is uncovered, market prices
tend to be revised downward. As in the case of the 1989 S&L crisis, the 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crises was
preceded by overvaluation of the real estate sector, which spread to the banking industry (banks and
S&Ls) through the linkages between the real estate sector and theﬁnancial sector viamortgage lending
and securitization. The introduction of credit default swaps (CDS), issued by insurance companies, also
linked in the insurance industry and placed it in the center of the crisis.
In this paper, we focus on four types of ﬁnancial institutions: banks, S&Ls, insurance ﬁrms, and
REITs. The rationale for choosing banks and S&Ls is self-evident because they shed light on the impact
of economic stimuli andplannedﬁnancial stability interventionson thebanking sector, themajor focus
of such interventions. Examining banks, S&Ls, and REITs sheds light on the impact of interventions on
the housing sector. We chose insurance companies because they offer credit default swaps that made
them a catalyst in the ﬁnancial crisis in general and in the banking and real estate sectors in particular,
exposing their portfolios to market and credit risks. A brief discussion follows on the rationale behind
including the four types of ﬁnancial institutions.
2.1.1. Banks and S&Ls
As more information was uncovered about their operations, banks and S&Ls started to be seen as
major private-sector catalysts for the credit boom and also precipitators of the recent crisis. Wilmarth
(2009) and Kaufman (2010) provide excellent summaries of the role of banks in the ﬁnancial crisis.
Even prior to the crisis, S&Ls were largely losing favor and declining, with many thrifts converting
their charters to banks. Although the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009 is considered largely banking-
centered, “ﬁve of the seven biggest ﬁnancial institution failures in 2007 and 2008 were OTS-regulated
thrifts” (McCoy, 2009). The collapse of the thriftswas blamed on irresponsible loan decisions and some
regulatory mistakes by the Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (McCoy, 2009).2
With the passage of the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act, also known as the Gramm
Leach Bliley (GLB) Act, consolidation and conglomeration havemarked the ﬁnancial services industry.
Whether these changes beneﬁted banks or increased risks is still inconclusive. Mamun, Hassan, and
Van Lai (2004) show that, by exploiting the diversiﬁcation opportunities afforded by the GLB Act of
1999, the ﬁnancial services industry reduced the exposure of ﬁnancial services to systematic risk.
They further note that the banking industry, especially larger banks, beneﬁted most from the GLB
Act deregulations. In contrast, Rajan (2006) discusses the strategy that some banks used of ofﬂoading
more plain vanilla risks from their balance sheets into the balance sheets of investment managers,
insurance companies, and pension funds. In a post-mortemanalysis,Wilmarth (2009) notes thatwhile
they generated revenue, GLB and the resulting strategy shifts also signiﬁcantly increased systemic risk
in both U.S. and global ﬁnancial markets.
2.1.2. Insurance companies
The volatility in the markets during the crisis did not impact insurance companies heavily because
they had minimal risk exposure from the housing market collapse. Furthermore, their investment
focus is largely long-term because they were not originators or major investors of mortgage-based
ﬁnancial instruments (Schich, 2009). These facts may suggest that insurance companies were mini-
mally affected by the crisis. However, ﬁnancial guarantee companies are involved in activities similar
to investment banks, such as the now-infamous credit default swaps. These activities contributed to
2 “US Thrift Charter May Be Hard To Kill.” Wall Street Journal, 2009.
                
 
                 
              
                    
             
                
             
  
               
               
             
             
             
               
               
                  
            
               
              
                  
                 
                  
             
                
               
                
              
               
               
              
           
                
               
            
            
             
               
                
               
              
               
               
                
             
      
increased risk, placing the insurance industry in the epicenter of the crisis, in step with banks and
thrifts.
2.1.3. REITs
By the end of 2008, U.S. REITs, deeply burdenedwith debt and confrontedwith illiquidity in a falling
real estatemarket, facedboth increased cost of capital anddifﬁculty inﬁnding capital.3 Devaney (2012)
examines the risk and return impact of the SEC ban on short selling on a sample of REITs to ﬁnd that
the ﬁrms experienced signiﬁcant event-induced risk. He concludes that the ban induced volatility in
both the REITs on the short-sale restriction and on unrestricted REITs as well. Thus, we include REITs
in our sample to analyze the impact of interventions in the real estate sector.
2.2. Literature review
The causes of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009 are manifold, with a large convergence toward the
following: the housing boom in the U.S., low interest rates that fueled the boom, careless lending
and investment decision-making, poor earnings management, lack of oversight on the part of the
regulators, and the underestimation of systemic risks emerging out of the housing and mortgage
market (Basse et al., 2009; Wilmarth, 2009; Kaufman, 2010; Cohen, Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian,
2012).
This paper relates to twobroad strands of literature onﬁnancial institutions. Theﬁrst strand focuses
on the stockmarket reaction to regulatory events. Sundaram, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) use a sam-
ple of banks and S&Ls to analyze the stockmarket perception of the debate and passage of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989. Their evidence suggests that
FIRREA produced positive abnormal returns for both banks and S&Ls, and that the addition of stricter
capital standards produced positive returns for S&Ls. They also note the passage of FIRREA increased
the risk for bothbanks andS&Ls, perhapsowing to increased costs of premiums for bothgroups. In their
study of the impact of FIRREA on the risk proﬁles of savings institutions,Madura andWiley (2000) ﬁnd
a reduction in interest rate risk and real estate risk. They also ﬁnd that the results vary across savings
institutions, with smaller institutions and institutions with higher levels of capital exhibiting a more
marked reduction in risk. Mamun et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial services industry gained from the
passing of the GLB Act in 1999, which signiﬁcantly reduced the exposure to systematic risk. However,
risk reduction, they note, was not uniform across the industry, and the banking sector gained themost
in terms of reduced risk, followed by the insurance industry. More recently, Veronesi and Zingales
(2010) examine the valuation effect of TARP on nine large banks by conducting a complete wealth
analysis of the U.S. government intervention on October 14, 2008, via an aggregate event study. They
note that the primary beneﬁciaries were bondholders. In their study of the market’s perception of
risk associated with deregulation, which uses nine different industries, including ﬁnancial services,
Semaan andDrake (2011) note a decrease inmarket risk for ﬁrms following deregulation, except in the
case of insurance brokers. They also ﬁnd that the security and commodity broker industry and bank
holding companies experienced only a short-term increase in industry-speciﬁc risk in comparison to
industry-systematic risk, and conclude that these industries learned to adapt to deregulation faster.
Elyasiani, Mester, and Pagano (2011) examine whether the market reactions to TARP infusions of
capital were similar to capital infusions by investors in the markets. They ﬁnd that investors reacted
positively to the news of TARP injections but negatively to the news of capital injections through non-
TARP funding. In a study examining the effect of TARP on increasing bank capitalization and reducing
bank risk-taking, Black and Hazelwood (2012) note that size impacts risk-taking by banks. They also
argue that TARP banks were given discordant objectives to (1) increase lending in a riskier economic
period and (2) increase bank stability and reduce incentives to take on excessive risk. Utilizing a
GARCH model, Cheng, Elyasiani, and Lin (2010) test the market reaction to the 2004 Spitzer suit on
3 Ernst and Young (2010). Against all odds: Global Real Estate Investment Trust Report, http://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/Global-REIT-report-2010-Against-all-odds/$FILE/Global REIT report 2010 Against all odds.pdf
              
        
             
            
            
              
             
              
             
                
              
                 
              
                
           
             
            
            
               
               
                
           
                 
               
                 
               
          
         
           
              
             
                
                
                
                  
              
                  
             
               
              
               
              
              
               
                
                   
              
             
                  
                     
the insurance industry and ﬁnd the various sectors of the insurance industry are closely integrated,
resulting in negative sectoral contagion and positive competitive effects.
The second strand of literature examines characteristics of ﬁrms that are subject to government
interventions. These studies examine factors that impact the differential effects of regulation, such
as size, industry, and geography (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Binder, 1985b; Millon-Cornett &
Tehranian, 1989; Cornett & Tehranian, 1990; Goddard, Molyneux, &Wilson, 2009; Cheng et al., 2010).
More recently, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) ﬁnd that banks that received capital infusions under
TARP tend tobe larger,with lowercapital ratios, lowermarket-to-book ratios, greaterderivativesexpo-
sure, and weaker funding, and have better quality assets and operate in weaker-performing regions
when compared with banks that did not receive TARP funds. Cohen et al. (2012) show that banks
with a pattern of earnings management in bank ﬁnancial statements in pre-crisis periods are more
likely to show a larger propensity for downside risk during a crisis period. They also show that stock
price crashes in these ﬁrms (tail risk) might signal impending problems in operating performance for
these ﬁrms. Naceur and Omran (2011) use bank-level data from ten countries to assess the impact of
ﬁnancial development, bank regulations,market structure, and institutional factors on bank efﬁciency
and proﬁtability for the 1989–2005 period. They fail to identify any signiﬁcant relationship between
macroeconomic variables and bank performance, and note that banks operating in a well-developed
stock market environment tend to have greater proﬁt opportunities. Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and
Tehranian (2011) ﬁnd that during the ﬁnancial crisis, bankswithmore illiquid assets in their portfolios
(more loans and securitized assets and less core deposits and capital) had more trouble lending rela-
tive to other banks. They ﬁnd that constrained banks face off-balance sheet liquidity risk in the form
of undrawn loan commitments, which largely contributes to diminished lending capacity. Diamond
and Rajan (2001) suggest that banks might ﬁnd equity capital a buffer in times of distress. Berger and
Bouwman (2013) ﬁnd that higher capital levels raise small banks’ probability of survival at all times;
however, formedium and large banks, they ﬁnd that capital is especially helpful in times of crisis. This
ﬁnding is even stronger if governmental interventions are limited. This implies that bank size in terms
of holding capital is also an important factor in this study.
2.3. Selected events and expected industry reaction to the events
Our analysis requires identiﬁcation of signiﬁcant dates surrounding proposed or passed govern-
mental measures during the 2007–2009 crisis period. As Binder (1985a) notes, the complexity of the
legislative process and the multiple announcements made often make it difﬁcult to isolate exactly
when new information reaches the market. The purpose of this study is not to examine every single
event, but to examine the impact of themajor interventions for the period October 2007 through May
2009 on the four sub-groups of ﬁnancial services ﬁrms. To identify dates for such measures, we begin
by using the timeline of the ﬁnancial crisis available at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We use
this timeline to parse out the signiﬁcant dateswhen governmentalmeasureswere proposed or passed
as acts, stimuli, or laws by the SEC, Treasury, or Federal Reserve Board. Because the root causes of the
crisis were embedded in the housing markets and linked via mortgage lending and securitization
to the banking and insurance sectors, we identify nine events that are not ﬁrm-speciﬁc, but rather
demonstrate possible linkages among the real estate and ﬁnancial sectors. Table 1 lists these nine
dates. While we are aware of many other interventions and relevant events during this period, our
intent is to focus on events that are not ﬁrm-speciﬁc (for instance, the Fannie/Freddie conservatorship,
the AIG and Countrywide bailouts, and the Lehman failure). Furthermore, we conﬁne our selection to
those dates included in the Timeline of the Crisis posted by the St. Louis Federal Reserve.4
We present below a brief discussion of each event and the predicted sign of the coefﬁcient for
abnormal returns and risk.Wealsoprovidea summaryof thepredicted signs in Fig. 1. Theﬁrst eventwe
examine is the HOPENOW initiative announced by then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, alongwith
Housing Secretary Alphonso Jackson. This initiative was the earliest action taken by the government
4 For instance, in the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy, on September 17, 2008, the SEC announced a temporary emergency
ban on short-selling again, but this event is not included in the St. Louis Fed Timeline; therefore, we do not include it.
           
    
    
  
              
        
          
  
                   
               
          
        
                 
          
            
   
                  
            
    
               
          
           
         
          
      
    
 
              
            
  
                 
         
            
             
              
            
              
           
                
            
           
               
           
       
Table 1 
Days of signiﬁcant news announcements regarding regulations surrounding the ﬁnancial crisis. 
Event number Event
D1 HOPE NOW Press Release, Treasury 
Department Press Release 
D2 Public Law 110–185 
D3 SEC Press Release 
D4 Public Law 110–289 
D5 H.R. 1424, Public Law 110–343 
D6 Treasury Department Press Release, Fact 
Sheet 
D7 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 
D8 Treasury Department Press Release, Draft 
Legislation 
D9 FDIC Press Release 
Date 
October 10, 2007
February 13, 2008
July 15, 2008
July 30, 2008 
October 3, 2008 
February 10, 2009 
February 17, 2009 
March 25, 2009 
May 20, 2009 
Description 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson announces the HOPE NOW initiative, an alliance of 
investors, servicers, mortgage market participants, and credit and homeowners’ 
counselors encouraged by the Treasury Department and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development 
President Bush signs the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–185) into law 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issues an emergency order 
temporarily prohibiting naked short-selling in the securities of Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and primary dealers at commercial and investment banks 
President Bush signs into law the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Public 
Law 110–289), which, among other provisions, authorizes the Treasury to purchase 
GSE obligations and reforms the regulatory supervision of the GSEs under a new 
Federal Housing Finance Agency 
Congress passes and President Bush signs into law the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–343), which establishes the $ 700 billion 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announces a Financial Stability Plan 
involving Treasury purchases of convertible preferred stock in eligible banks, the 
creation of a Public-Private Investment Fund to acquire troubled loans and other 
assets from ﬁnancial institutions, expansion of the Federal Reserve’s Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), and new initiatives to stem residential 
mortgage foreclosures and to support small-business lending 
President Obama signs into law the “American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009,” which includes a variety of spending measures and tax cuts intended to 
promote economic recovery 
The U.S. Treasury Department proposes legislation that would grant the U.S. 
government authority to put certain ﬁnancial institutions into conservatorship or 
receivership to avert systemic risks posed by the potential insolvency of a signiﬁcant 
ﬁnancial ﬁrm. The authority is modeled on the resolution authority that the FDIC has 
with respect to banks and that the Federal Housing Finance Agency has with regard to 
the GSEs. The authority would apply to non-bank ﬁnancial institutions that have the 
potential to pose systemic risks to the economy but that are not currently subject to 
the resolution authority of the FDIC or the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
President Obama signs the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, which 
temporarily raises FDIC deposit insurance coverage from $ 100,000 per depositor to $ 
250,000 per depositor. The new coverage at FDIC-insured institutions will expire on 
January 1, 2014, when the amount will return to its standard level of $ 100,000 per 
depositor for all account categories except IRAs and certain other retirement accounts. 
This action supersedes the October 3, 2008, changes 
  
      
          
    
    
  
  
  
  
      
     
  
            
                 
                      
                      
                 
                 
                 
                 
            
             
               
              
              
            
             
              
               
               
                
            
                 
               
             
               
                 
                
               
                 
             
              
Event Expected Sign
Banks S&Ls
Insurance 
Companies REITs
Returns Risk Returns Risk Returns Risk Returns Risk
D1 (HOPE NOW) + + + + NC NC + + 
D2 (Economic Smulus Act of 2008) +/- + +/- + +/- + NC NC
D3 (SEC ban on short sales) + + + + + + + + 
D4 (HERA) +/- + +/- + + + + + 
D5 (TARP) +/- +/- +/- +/- + + + + 
D6 (Financial Stability Plan) +/- +/- +/- +/- + + + + 
D7 (ARRA) NC +/- NC +/- NC +/- NC +/- 
D8 (Conservatorship of ﬁnancial 
instuons) - - - - NC NC NC NC
D9 (Helping Families Save their 
Home Act of 2009) + + + + NC + + + 
Fig. 1. Expected Signs of Events on Returns and Risk of Financial Institution.
 
For Returns: ‘+’ implies an expected increase in abnormal returns; ‘−’ implies an expected decrease in abnormal returns.
 
‘+/−’ sign not predictable; i.e. return could go up or down; for risk: ‘+’ implies an expected decrease in risk; ‘−’ implies an
 
expected increase in risk; ‘+/−’ sign not predictable, i.e. risk could go up or down; NC: implies NO change is expected in returns
 
(risk).
 
to stem the rising foreclosures as the subprime crisis began to emerge. The intent was to create an 
alliancebetween thebanking and housing sectors. We expect to ﬁnd this initiative to be a positive stock 
market event for banks, S&Ls, and REITs. To the extent that it reduces claims against credit default risk 
swaps by banks and S&Ls, it may impact insurance companies; thus, we expect little or no impact on 
insurance company returns. Because foreclosures decreased under this regulation, we expect to ﬁnd 
that systematic risk for the banking and housing industries also decreased, representing a downward 
shift in beta for banks, S&Ls, and REITs. The second governmental intervention we examine is the 
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, signed by President George W. Bush, which included rebate checks 
and two tax planning opportunities to help businesses and homeowners. The stimulus was intended to 
ameliorate the effects of an anticipated economic slowdown and, among other provisions, temporarily 
raise the limitations on the maximum original principal balance of residential mortgages in which 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could invest. Many states also enacted anti-predatory lending laws, and 
several jurisdictions set ceilings based on some variation of the Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac conforming 
loan size limit. Households were expected to reduce their debt or save the monies5 they received from 
the stimulus. As a result, it was expected that the banking industry would see lending improve and 
savings rise, while insurance companies would see fewer policies surrendered. Because rates were 
already low for lending, and defaults were still a challenge for banks and S&Ls, we expect to ﬁnd 
that while banks may have beneﬁted from reduced foreclosures, they may not have been able to 
lend easily unless the economy recovered concurrently. Therefore, it is difﬁcult to predict whether 
returns of the ﬁnancial institutions may have reacted positively or negatively to this news, while their 
risk may have decreased. Thus, we are unable to predict whether this is a positive or negative event 
for banks and S&Ls. For REITs, we do not expect any impact because the economic stimulus focused 
largely on residential mortgages rather than commercial real estate. The third event we examine is the 
passing of the SEC emergency ban on the naked short-selling of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and 799 
ﬁnancial companies. The concern was that short sales of these securities were causing unanticipated 
and extreme ﬂuctuations of prices, and threatening the ﬁnancial stability of the markets. We expect 
5 http://www.nber.org/digest/mar09/w14753.html 
                 
                
                
 
               
             
               
               
             
             
               
                 
                  
        
               
              
                 
               
               
                
                   
                
                  
             
            
             
              
               
            
             
              
              
             
                 
               
               
                
               
              
             
            
             
              
                
                
         
               
           
                
               
               
      
to ﬁnd that this event positively affected all four types of ﬁnancial institutions and led to a reduction
in systematic risk owing to expected reduction in price volatility. We also expect to ﬁnd that this
reduction in short sales led to an increase in price and hence positive abnormal returns around this
event date.
The fourth event we examine, the passing of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of
2008, authorized the Treasury to purchase GSE obligations; reform the regulatory supervision of the
GSEs under a new Federal Housing Finance Agency; provide relief to lenders and borrowers, and take
steps to prevent a future housing crisis; and reform regulations related to REITs. The REIT reforms
and property development provided by HERA were expected to have the additional consequence of
potentially alleviating the blight and property value loss associated with foreclosures. We expect to
ﬁnd that this event had a positive effect on REITs and insurance companies because the government
covered the losses incurred by the GSEs. Regarding banks and S&Ls, we expect to ﬁnd amixed reaction
based on the amount of GSE preferred shares held by the bank. We expect to ﬁnd a reduction in
systematic risk owing to lessened foreclosures and lowered defaults.
The ﬁfth event we examine is the very controversial $ 700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 signed into law by President
Bush. The purpose of the Act was to unfreeze the credit markets and revive the economy. We suspect
that the markets were skeptical about such an expensive stimulus package and its effects. Evidence is
mixed on whether the banks actually used the government monies to continue lending or instead to
repair their own balance sheets (Li, 2012), although Li (2012) shows a positive stimulus effect of TARP
on credit supply during the ﬁnancial crisis. The impact of TARP on risk may be mixed and may be tied
to bank size. Black and Hazelwood (2012) note that while loan risk increased for large bank recipients
of TARP, the opposite was true for small banks. S&Ls were expected to have a similar reaction to the
banks, while REITs and insurance companies were expected to beneﬁt from the economic recovery.
We expect to ﬁnd that TARP reduced systematic risk in banks and S&Ls.
The sixth event we examine is Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s announcement of the Finan-
cial Stability Plan. The plan involved the Treasury’s purchase of convertible preferred stock in eligible
banks, the creation of a Public-Private Investment Fund to acquire troubled loans andother assets from
ﬁnancial institutions, the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facil-
ity (TALF), and the implementation of new initiatives to stem residential mortgage foreclosures and
support small business lending. This plan was passed to restore conﬁdence in ﬁnancial markets and
institutions, and to improve transparency.While somemay have viewed the ﬁnancial stability as pos-
itive, government investment in banks and S&Ls would create discomfort among others, who treated
this eventwith skepticism, thus creating a negative reaction.We expect to ﬁnd amixed reaction in the
market with respect to banks and S&Ls, but a positive reaction from REITs and insurance companies
(those that provided credit risk insurance) owing to reduction in troubled assets on the bank balance
sheets and reduced foreclosures. For these same reasons, we also expect to ﬁnd a reduction in risk.
The seventh event we examine is the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, a
ﬁscal stimulus package intended to stabilize theﬁnancialmarkets and thehousing sector by increasing
aggregate demand6 via $ 787 billion in tax cuts and government spending. The economic stimulus
was expected to help small businesses grow, thereby promoting economic recovery, creating jobs,
improving lending from ﬁnancial institutions, and improving the housing sector. While the intent of
the stimulus was to jumpstart the economy, the market perception, while positive, may have been
muted because of the number of bailouts that had been witnessed at the time. Owing to uncertainty
about the impact of the stimulus on the economyand thus the housing, insurance, and banking sectors,
we cannot predict the direction of change in systematic risk.
The eighth event we examine is the proposed legislation to grant the U.S. government authority to
move certain ﬁnancial institutions into conservatorship or receivership. This legislationwas proposed
in order to avert systemic risks posed by the potential insolvency of a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial ﬁrm. Further,
it may have created the perception in the markets that banks and S&Ls were becoming nationalized
6 Strobel, Caroline D., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009, Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance (Wiley);
Jul/Aug2009, Vol. 20 Issue 5, p83-85, 3p.
                 
                
               
 
               
              
                
                 
             
               
              
  
  
            
                
              
             
 
             
           
              
              
                
               
             
          
              
  
           
              
     
               
             
               
        
              
  
               
             
              
   
   
 
                
            
and therefore caused a decline in prices. We expect to ﬁnd that this reaction was more pronounced in
banks and S&Ls than in insurance companies and REITs. We expect to ﬁnd a reduction in systematic
risk owing to fewer foreclosures, lowered defaults, and the fact that the government was taking on
the risk.
The last event that we examine is President Obama’s signing of the Helping Families Save Their
Homes Act of 2009, which temporarily raised FDIC deposit insurance coverage from $ 100,000 per
depositor to $ 250,000 per depositor. This Act was expected to help lenders as well as households,
resulting in a positive reaction frombanks, S&Ls, andREITs; but no reactionwas expected in returns for
insurance companies. TheActwas expected to ease restrictions on reﬁnancingoptions andunderwater
mortgages for many borrowers. We expect to ﬁnd the market react more positively toward S&Ls and
REITs; and because it reduces claims against credit defaults, insurance companiesmay see a reduction
in systematic risk.
3. Research hypothesis
Given the recent literatureon regulatory interventions in theﬁnancial services industry (Bayazitova
& Shivdasani, 2012; Gaby & Walker, 2011; Black & Hazelwood, 2012) that largely focuses on a single
intervention (TARP) or on a single industry, our study extends existing research by examining how
ﬁnancial service ﬁrms reacted to a series of governmental interventions. Our research hypotheses are
as follows:
Hypothesis 1. H01: The average excess returns for banks, savings and loans, insurance companies,
and REITs during the announcement period are not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
H01 is tested using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)model in whichwe regress the returns
for a portfolio of banks, savings and loans, insurance companies, and REITs against market returns,
using a series of dummy variables to control for the release of information about the interventions. In
this model, the reaction of banks, savings and loans, insurance companies, and REITs to the interven-
tions can be measured separately to determine whether the new measures impacted these different
ﬁnancial institution groups differently. Our next hypothesis further addresses this issue.
Hypothesis 2. H02: The announcement period abnormal returns are not different for the four types
of ﬁnancial institutions.
Typically, the literature has shown that, besides intra-industry effects, the various interventions
may not impact the different institutions the same way because of differences in portfolio structure
and the nature of their businesses.
Changes in regulation also result in changes in risk for regulated ﬁrms. While some recent gov-
ernmental interventions pervaded the entire industry, the portfolio structure of the ﬁrms may have
resulted in different risk impacts for different sub-groups within the industry. In order to test for
structural shifts in risk, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. H03: The systematic risk remained the same for ﬁnancial institutions during and after
the intervention period.
H03 can be examined in several ways. We test to determine whether the slope coefﬁcients for the
four types of ﬁnancial institutions changed during the period when the intervention occurred and
during the post-intervention period. A signiﬁcant change in the coefﬁcients represents a shift in beta
risk for the ﬁrms.
4. Data and methodology
4.1. Data
The sample comprises all ﬁrms in the CRSP database with SIC codes from Banks (6020, 6021, 6022,
6029), Savings and Loans (6035, 6036), Insurance (6311–6399), and Real Estate Investment Trusts
       
   
      
      
       
      
  
  
       
    
     
     
      
     
       
   
       
       
      
      
     
  
   
       
       
      
      
       
    
   
       
       
      
      
       
       
   
       
       
      
      
       
       
                 
                  
                  
                   
                 
                 
                
                
             
                  
                 
          
                
                
                 
Table 2
Sample descriptive statistics (as of October 2011).
Panel A. Firm characteristics
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
Total assets 593 39,837 1747 202,208 18 1,965,159
Trading volume 593 94,376 9953 371,334 9 6,182,785
ROA 593 0.0180 0.0111 0.0246 −0.0936 0.1944
ROE 593 0.1073 0.1120 0.1476 −2.7586 1.0184
Proﬁt margin 593 0.1392 0.1340 0.1920 −3.0311 1.1753
Debt ratio 593 0.6818 0.8886 0.3392 0.0000 0.9801
Panel B. Number of ﬁrms
Variable Total Bank S&L Insurance REIT
Total ﬁrms 593 323 66 104 100
Other OTC 26 19 5 1 1
Foreign incorporated 25 24 0 1 0
Big 8 Auditor 318 132 14 94 78
Panel C. Banks characteristics
Total assets 323 60,570 1644 264,554 117 1,965,159
Trading volume 323 84,014 3739 463,349 9 6,182,785
ROA 323 0.0099 0.0097 0.0050 −0.0237 0.0293
ROE 323 0.1146 0.1173 0.0584 −0.2263 0.2662
Proﬁt margin 323 0.1390 0.1396 0.0663 −0.4420 0.3336
Debt ratio 323 0.9075 0.9106 0.0284 0.7652 0.9801
Panel D. S&L characteristics
Total assets 66 2256 787 4339 174 28,482
Trading volume 66 26,560 1175 90,056 26 581,568
ROA 66 0.0058 0.0058 0.0040 −0.0057 0.0143
ROE 66 0.0565 0.0497 0.0436 −0.0330 0.1907
Proﬁt margin 66 0.0912 0.0936 0.0625 −0.1039 0.1953
Debt ratio 66 0.8675 0.8822 0.0586 0.6645 0.9500
Panel E Insurance characteristics
Total assets 104 34,207 4322 112,299 114 979,414
Trading volume 104 162,332 35,615 302,531 20 2,129,001
ROA 104 0.0391 0.0369 0.0287 −0.0487 0.1633
ROE 104 0.1389 0.1325 0.0898 −0.1337 0.7796
Proﬁt margin 104 0.1225 0.1083 0.0860 −0.0480 0.4384
Debt ratio 104 0.0544 0.0415 0.0604 0.0000 0.4921
Panel F REIT characteristics
Total assets 100 3530 2032 4566 18 30,716
Trading volume 100 101,931 72,850 131,837 28 906,919
ROA 100 0.0306 0.0255 0.0415 −0.0936 0.1944
ROE 100 0.0848 0.1070 0.3257 −2.7586 1.0184
Proﬁt margin 100 0.1885 0.1848 0.4376 −3.0311 1.1753
Debt ratio 100 0.4824 0.4977 0.1914 0 0.8353
(6798). A total of 330 Banks, 67 S&Ls, 105 Insurance companies and 100 REITs included results in a
total sample of 602 ﬁrms. The event period begins on October 10, 2007, and ends on May 20, 2009
(see Table 1), a period of 406 trading days. The sample period extends 100 trading days prior to and
after the event period. In order to be included in the ﬁnal sample, ﬁrms must be active for the entire
sample period of 606 trading days. We collect return data for all ﬁrms in the appropriate SIC code
from CRSP. Firms that do not have return data for the entire sample period are removed. The ﬁrms
with complete returns make up the ﬁnal sample list for each category. Firms are designated as Banks,
S&Ls, Insurance ﬁrms, or REITs according to their SIC code in CRSP. Financial data are obtained from
Compustat for S&Ls, Insurance ﬁrms, and REITs. Banking ﬁnancial data are obtained from Compustat
Bank Annual. For all ﬁrms, ﬁnancial data are taken from the ﬁscal year end up to, but not exceeding,
the month of September 2007, because the ﬁrst event date is October 10, 2007. Thirteen ﬁrms do not
have complete cross-sectional data and are omitted from the cross-sectional tests.
Panel A of Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics on key variables for our sample. The average
ﬁrm size is $ 39.8million, with an average trading volume of 94.3million shares outstanding. Average
ROE is about 10.73%, with an average proﬁt margin of 13.92%; average ROA is 1.8%. The average debt
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ratio for the sample is about 68%. Panel B of Table 2 gives details on the breakdown of ﬁrms. For the 593 
ﬁrms with cross-sectional data, the sample comprises 323 commercial banks, 66 S&Ls, 104 insurance 
companies, and 100 REITs. Of these ﬁrms, 25 are incorporated overseas, while 26 trade on smaller 
exchanges (Other OTC); 318 ﬁrms, including 132 banks, use a Big 8 Auditor. We report the descriptive 
statistics by sub-group in Panels C through F of Table 2. On average, banks comprise the largest ﬁrms in 
terms of total assets ($ 60.57 million), while insurance ﬁrms report the highest mean trading volume 
(162.3), followed by REITs (101.9). Insurance companies report the highest ROA and ROE (3.91% and 
13.89%, respectively), while REITs report the highest proﬁt margin (18.85%). The highest debt ratios 
are found for banks (90.75%), followed by S&Ls (86.75%). 
4.2. Methodology 
4.2.1. Announcement effects and risk shifts 
One of the difﬁculties in examining the effect of government intervention is to pinpoint the dates 
when value-relevant information about the proposed measure became available. To obviate this dif­
ﬁculty, we use the St. Louis Federal Reserve timeline on the ﬁnancial crisis. The method of analysis is 
discussed in Binder (1985a, 1985b) and Boardman, Vertinsky, and Whistler (1997). The model is suit­
able to a regulatory event that includes multiple event dates and is used in a number of studies that 
examine wealth effects surrounding regulatory changes (Mitchell & Mulherin, 1988; Sundaram et al., 
1992; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007). We employ the same procedure, using portfolios, thereby also 
alleviating the problem of event day clustering. Speciﬁcally, our model is as follows: 
rj,t = aj + a1j DP + bjrmt + b1jD0 rmt + b11 j DP rmt + CkjDik + ejt (1) 
where rj,t is the portfolio return for day t, aj is the regression constant, a1j is the shift in regression 
constant after the event period, rmt is the S&P 500 Index return, bj is the coefﬁcient representing 
beta, b1j is the coefﬁcient representing a shift in beta during the event period, b1 1j is the coefﬁcient 
representing a shift in beta after the event period, D0 is the dummy variable equal to 1 during the 
event period, DP is the dummy variable equal to 1 after the event period, Dik is the dummy variable 
equal to 1 on the day prior to and the day of event I, Ckj is the coefﬁcient of the information dummy 
variable k for portfolio j, ejt is the error term for portfolio j 
The variable Dik is a dummy variable equal to 1 for each of the dates corresponding to our events 
and the day prior to each event. Nine dichotomous variables, D1 through D9, mark each of the event 
dates and the date just prior equal to 1. An additional dichotomous variable, D10, is equal to 1 for all 
the event dates and all the dates just prior to the event date. Thus, D10 is used as an alternative in 
the above equation to examine the cumulative impact of all the event dates. D1 through D9 produce 
the cumulative abnormal return for each event date, while D10 represents the cumulative abnormal 
return for all the event dates combined. Dummy variables are also created equal to 1 for the period 
from the ﬁrst event to the last event (DurDummy, or D0), and for the period immediately after the last 
event to the end of the sample period (PostDummy, or DP). The model described above also speciﬁes 
the systematic risk (beta) and shift in beta (risk shift) during and after the event period via the dummy 
variable D0, and estimates the beta coefﬁcient for the pre- and post-event periods. 
4.2.2. Cross-sectional analysis 
We next examine the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics on our full sample of ﬁrms via the 
following model: 
D10 = ˇ0 + ˇ1Sizej + ˇ2Big 8 Auditorj 
+ ˇ3Debt Ratioj + ˇ4Other OTCj 
(2) 
+ ˇ5ROEj + ˇ6Non USj + ˇ7Ln Volumej 
+ ˇ8Size ∗ Other OTC + ˇ9Bankj + uj 
We measure ﬁrm size by the natural log of the total assets of the ﬁrm. Big 8 Auditor is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if the ﬁrm uses a Big 8 auditor and is used to measure the reputation effect of the 
                  
                   
                    
                  
                 
      
                 
                
               
             
              
              
                
                 
               
                
                    
             
                
              
              
               
                
             
             
            
               
               
             
                
                
                
              
              
              
            
                
                
                
              
               
              
               
 
                
           
  
 
   
               
                
ﬁrm. Debt Ratio is the debt-to-assets ratio of the ﬁrm and Other OTC is a dummy variable that equals
1 if the ﬁrm is listed as Other OTC (Compustat Exchange 19). ROE is ﬁrm Return on Equity, Banker is
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is a bank, and non-U.S. is a dummy variable that equals 1
if the ﬁrm is a non-U.S. ﬁrm. Trading Volume is the natural log of the monthly trading volume from
CRSP, and Size*OTC is an interaction variable for ﬁrm size and exchange type. All values are for the
ﬁscal year ending prior to September 2007.
Research on bank size and efﬁciency shows that banks from about $ 100 million to about $ 25
billion in size are the most efﬁcient (Berger, Demsetz, & Strahan, 1999). However, Fok, Chang, & Lee
(2004) argue that large banks have larger market shares and better access to capital and information,
which should lead to greater proﬁtability; hence, the relationship between size and abnormal return
may be ambiguous. Nevertheless, much of the political debate during the ﬁnancial crisis focused on
the twin issues of “moral hazard” and “systemic risk”; and “Too-Big-To-Fail” became a rallying cry
for both proponents and critics of the various legislations. We thus expect to see a positive relation
between size and abnormal return for this crisis period. Research shows that the presence of a Big 8
accounting ﬁrm has a reputation effect. For example, Michaely and Shaw (1995) ﬁnd that the market
perceives IPOs associated with more prestigious auditors (Big 8 ﬁrms) as less risky, and that the long-
runperformanceof IPOs is related to theprestige of the auditor used. Inhis studyof theEastAsianCrisis
of 1997–1998, Mitton (2002) ﬁnds that signiﬁcantly better stock price performance is associated with
ﬁrms that had indicators of higher disclosure quality in the form of auditors from Big Six accounting
ﬁrms. Thus, we posit a positive relation between auditor reputation (Big 8 Auditor) and abnormal
return. Extant agency theoretic perspectives argue that debt can have a monitoring effect, and hence
higher leveragemay alignmanagers to act in the interest of shareholders. Jensen andMeckling (1976),
Williams (1987), and Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) argue that the choice of leverage may be
based on the efﬁcient-risk hypothesis or the franchise value hypothesis, as follows: More efﬁcient
ﬁrms (those with higher proﬁtability or ROE) choose higher leverage because their higher efﬁciency
reduces the costs of bankruptcy and, thus, increased proﬁtability (from increased efﬁciency) protects
them from future crisis. The franchise value hypothesis is more in line with the reputational capital
idea and argues that more efﬁcient ﬁrms choose lower leverage (and higher capital) to protect their
franchise value (reputation) to avoid any possibility of liquidation. Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) ﬁnd
thatmore leveragedﬁrms have higher abnormal returns. Given the nature of the crisis and the bailouts
thatensued,wepredict apositive coefﬁcient formore leveragedﬁrmsandapositive coefﬁcient forROE.
We also predict a positive sign for non-U.S. ﬁrms becausewe expect that these ﬁrms are somewhat
sheltered fromthe impactofU.S. government interventions.Weexpect apositive coefﬁcienton trading
volume, because research shows that volume increases as a result of informed trading. Research also
discusses the role of trading volume as an information variable, and indicates a positive relationship
between returns and trading volume (Karpoff, 1987; Stickel & Verrecchia, 1994; Brailsford, 1996;
Lee & Rui, 2002). Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) note that volume tends to be higher when
stock prices are increasing than when they are falling. We predict a negative coefﬁcient for ﬁrms that
trade on smaller exchanges (Other OTC); we also interact size and Other OTC and posit that abnormal
performance is negatively related to larger ﬁrms that trade on smaller exchanges. Hegde, Lin, and
Varshney (2010) ﬁnd that NYSE spreads are smaller than NASDAQ (OTC) spreads and thatmore orders
are placed with NYSE. Besides, NYSE-listed stocks can be traded on other exchanges; while NASDAQ’s
dual-listing program, which allows companies to list on both the NASDAQ and the NYSE, only began
in 2004.
Finally, we estimate themodel above for risk shifts in these ﬁnancial services ﬁrms during and after
the event. All cross-sectional regressions are estimated with the White heteroskedasticity correction
for standard errors.
5. Results
5.1. Announcement period returns
We begin our analysis by examining the overall results for all the regulations and present the
regression estimates of our model for each individual event in Table 3. Panel A presents the results
                
  
          
  
   
              
              
            
        
  
              
           
               
                
          
   
  
              
              
               
                
 
   
Table 3
Regression estimates for portfolios of all ﬁrms and by type of Financial Institution and by event.
Informational dummy variables
Constant BETA 10/10/2007 2/13/2008 7/15/2008 7/30/2008 10/3/2008 2/10/2009 2/17/2009 3/25/2009 5/20/2009
Variable Intercept Post
alpha
S&P
return
Post
event
During
event
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9
Panel A: all ﬁrms
Coefﬁcient 0.0006 −0.0008 0.7795 0.2167 0.2068 −0.004 −0.0025 −0.0166 −0.0029 0.0078 −0.0003 −0.008 −0.0039 −0.0074
p-value 0 0.0003 0 0 0 0.0053 0.0882 0 0.0445 0 0.8116 0 0.0071 0
Sig *** *** *** *** *** *** * *** ** *** *** *** ***
R-sq 0.1419 N 364,729 Pr > F 0.0001 Signiﬁcance ***
Panel B: banks
Coefﬁcient 0.0005 −0.0012 0.6913 0.1807 0.1762 −0.0039 −0.0018 −0.0219 0.0018 0.012 −0.0023 −0.0098 −0.0041 −0.0094
Error 0.0001 0.0003 0.0259 0.035 0.0266 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
t Value 3.73 −3.94 26.66 5.16 6.63 −1.98 −0.91 −11.14 0.94 6.09 −1.16 −4.96 −2.06 −4.77
Pr > |t| 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.048 0.3638 <.0001 0.3491 <.0001 0.2444 <.0001 0.0395 <0001
Sig *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** ** ***
R-sq 0.1109 N 331
Panel C: S&Ls
Coefﬁcient 0.0002 −0.0005 0.4594 0.0757 0.0725 −0.0042 −0.0011 −0.0208 −0.0052 0.0073 0.0076 −0.0013 −0.0019 −0.0026
Error 0.0003 0.0007 0.0576 0.0777 0.059 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044
t Value 0.63 −0.67 7.98 0.97 1.23 −0.97 −0.24 −4.76 −1.19 1.66 1.74 −0.31 −0.43 −0.59
Pr > |t| 0.5278 0.5054 <.0001 0.3301 0.2194 0.3323 0.8102 <.0001 0.2332 0.0967 0.0817 0.7599 0.669 0.5563
Sig *** *** * *
R-sq 0.0467 N 67
    
  
              
              
               
                
       
   
  
              
              
               
                
        
   
   
  
   
         
            
     
                              
           
      
                            
                               
                                  
     
      
      
      
Table 3
(Continued)
Panel D: insurance companies
Variable Intercept Post
alpha
S&P
return
Post
event
During
event
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9
Coefﬁcient 0.0008 0.0001 0.9676 0.1727 0.1998 −0.0041 −0.0067 −0.0065 −0.0064 0.0072 0.0006 −0.002 −0.0011 −0.0038
Error 0.0002 0.0005 0.04 0.054 0.041 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
t Value 4.19 0.19 24.2 3.2 4.88 −1.36 −2.2 −2.15 −2.11 2.36 0.2 −0.65 −0.36 −1.26
Pr > |t| <.0001 0.8525 <.0001 0.0014 <.0001 0.1729 0.0279 0.0319 0.0346 0.0184 0.8443 0.5146 0.7183 0.2095
Sig *** *** *** *** ** ** ** **
R-sq 0.2318 N 105
Panel E: REITs
Coefﬁcient 0.0013 −0.0006 1.0538 0.4787 0.4074 −0.004 −0.0012 −0.0062 −0.0138 −0.0051 0.0005 −0.0132 −0.0069 −0.0071
Error 0.0002 0.0006 0.0468 0.0632 0.048 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036
t Value 5.67 −1 22.51 7.58 8.49 −1.12 −0.33 −1.75 −3.88 −1.42 0.14 −3.72 −1.93 −1.99
Pr > |t| <.0001 0.3181 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2646 0.74 0.0804 0.0001 0.1557 0.885 0.0002 0.0539 0.0465
Sig *** *** *** *** * *** *** * **
R-sq 0.2676 N 100
Wald test for comparing
coefﬁcients among the
four types of ﬁnancial
institutions
Wald 7.52 5.66 151.21 21.16 47.5 4.48 37.73 7.97 27.66
Pr >Chi Sq 0.1106 0.2258 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 0.3453 <.0001 0.0926 <.0001
Sig *** *** *** *** * ***
This table provides the regression estimates for events. Panel A provides regression estimates for all ﬁrms for the event dates D1–D9. Panels B, C, D, and E provide estimates for banks,
savings and loans (S&Ls), insurance ﬁrms, and real estate investment trusts (REITs).
rj,t = aj + a1 j DP +bj rmt +b1 j D0 rmt +b1 1 DP rmt +
�
Ckj Dik + ejt .
rjt =portfolio return for day t; aj = constant prior to event period; a1 j = constant after the event period; rmt =S&P 500 Index return; bj = coefﬁcient representing beta; b1 j = coefﬁcient
representing a shift in beta during the event period; b1 1 j = coefﬁcient representing a shift in beta after the event period;D0 =dummy variable equal to 1 during the event period;DP =dummy
variable equal to 1 after event period; Dik =dummy variable equal to 1 on the day prior to and the day of event I; Ckj = coefﬁcient of the information dummy variable k for portfolio j;
ejt =error term for portfolio j.
*** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.5 level.
* Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
                 
                 
                
              
              
     
              
                  
                  
                  
              
              
               
             
           
                
                     
             
              
    
              
               
            
             
                
             
             
               
               
               
              
            
    
                  
               
               
               
                  
             
                
     
               
            
             
            
                 
              
               
                 
                     
              
                
                  
              
for all ﬁrms. We ﬁnd negative and highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for the events D1, D3, D7, D8, and
D9 for our full sample of ﬁrms. Coefﬁcients for D2 and D4 are also negative at the 10% and 5% levels
of signiﬁcance. Only one event date, D5, is positive and highly signiﬁcant. Thus, our results for the
full sample of ﬁrms show that the market views the announcements of the various interventions
as mostly negative events. We discuss the individual legislations and their impact on the different
industry groups in more detail below.
Table 3 also documents the regression estimates for the individual industry groups. For the sub-
sample of banks (Panel B of Table 3), events D1, D3, D7, D8, and D9 have negative coefﬁcients, of which
D1 and D8 are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. All other dates are highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. D5 is the
only positive event, and again is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The ﬁrst event date in our timeline, D1,
is the October 10, 2007, HOPE NOW initiative announced by then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson,
along with Housing Secretary Alphonso Jackson. The intent of HOPE NOW was to help homeowners
who might not be able to pay their mortgages. The alliance of credit and homeowners’ counselors,
mortgage services, andmortgage providers was formed to exploreways to reach at-risk homeowners,
explain alternatives to at-risk borrowers, and develop standards for mortgage counseling. However,
this event results in a marginally negative market reaction for the sub-sample of banks. At the time,
therewas just a hint of the ﬁnancial crisis thatwas to unfold, and it seems that themarket did notwant
any governmental interference. While HOPE NOW was intended to help mortgage owners, it seems
the market did not believe this initiative would beneﬁt banks because there were no compulsory
measures directed to ﬁnancial institutions.
The next signiﬁcant event date for banks, D3 (7/15/2008), signiﬁes the passing of the SEC emer-
gency ban on the naked short-selling of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, along with other extraordinary
emergency measures, including the public disclosure of short-selling positions of hedge funds and
other institutional money managers. Because of the tenuous conﬁdence in ﬁnancial companies at this
time, the SEC also banned naked short-selling in the stock of 799 ﬁnancial companies, in an attempt
to curtail aggressive short-selling of institutions that were perceived to be especially fragile. While
meant to boost the volatile markets during tumultuous times, this legislative announcement is again
viewednegatively by themarket, as evidenced by the negative andhighly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the
bank group. The next signiﬁcant negative events for banks are D7, D8, and D9. D7 represents February
17, 2009, the day that marked the passing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA);
and D8 marks the passing of the 3/25/09 legislation allowing troubled ﬁnancial institutions to be put
into conservatorship or receivership by the U.S. government. Finally, D9 marks the 5/20/09 Helping
Families Save their Homes legislation.
The ARRA bill, also known as the Stimulus Act, was one of the ﬁrst major acts passed by President
Barack Obama and the new Democratic Congress. ARRA was the focus of ﬁerce partisan debates in
Congress; it ultimately passed the House with no Republican votes and the Senate with merely three
Republican votes. This massive economic stimulus bill was estimated to cost $ 787 billion when it
ﬁnally passed. All of these acts were the subject of bitter wrangling along party lines; and by this time,
investors and the general public were also suffering from legislative and “bail-out” fatigue. Because
this waswidely perceived asmostly a “banking” crisis, it is not surprising to ﬁnd signiﬁcantly negative
coefﬁcients for the sample of banks.
For banks, D5 was the only announcement that was met with positive investor reaction, at the 1%
level. D5 marks 10/3/2008, the date when the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act passed. Better
known as TARP, this legislation created the Troubled Assets Recovery Program, established to buy
troubled assets from ﬁnancial institutions. Introduced in September 2008 and signed by President
George W. Bush in October 2008, TARP allowed the Treasury Department to spend up to $ 700 billion
to purchase troubled assets both domestically and internationally. At the time of TARP’s passage, the
marketwas reeling from themeltdown of Lehman Brothers. However, the initial attempt to pass TARP
failed, as the House rejected the ﬁrst version of the bill on Monday, September 29. After a four-hour
debate, the ﬁnal vote of 228 to 205 against was 13 votes shy of the 218 votes needed to pass the bill.
Stock markets reacted immediately to this news, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed 778
points lower for the day. Leaders of both political parties pleaded for the necessary votes, and TARP
ﬁnally passed onOctober 3, 2008, to the relief of investors and both political parties. It appears that the
markets believed the passage of TARPwould stem repercussions from the ongoing ﬁnancial crisis. Our
               
                
         
                 
                   
                
                
               
               
              
                  
               
            
             
           
               
             
      
                  
               
                 
             
                
                 
              
               
                 
               
               
                 
                 
             
              
             
           
              
 
                   
                   
                  
                  
                
              
              
          
            
                
              
                   
                     
                   
                   
                      
results conﬁrm this. Overall, the banking group reports negative coefﬁcients for ﬁve of the nine event
dates, while only one of the events has a positive coefﬁcient. The market reaction seems to validate
the perception that this was very much a “banking” crisis.7
For the sub-sample of S&Ls in Table 3, market reaction is more muted than for banks; and only
one event, D3, is strongly negative (Panel C of Table 3). As noted in Section 2.1, large thrifts such as
Countrywide, FSB, and Wachovia were in trouble during the crisis and were merged into or owned by
banks. Furthermore, from 1998 to 2008, a large number of S&Ls converted their charters to banks (see
footnote 2). Thus, themarket reaction to the ﬁnancial stability interventions and the stimulusmay not
appear distinctly for the S&L group separately from the banks. Asmentioned earlier,D3 marks the date
when theSECannounced stringent restrictions in the short-sellingofﬁnancial company stocks. Aswith
the sample of banks, themarket viewed D5 (the passing of TARP) as good news, albeit at the 10% level.
This is also true of D6 (2/10/2009), the passage of the Financial Stability Act, introduced by Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner, which created the Public–Private Investment fund. Under this act, the
Treasury department, along with the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board, unveiled the Public–Private
Investment Programs (PPIP) to buy troubled mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities from
banks. Despite this plan’s possible advance leak, the market still was skeptical of it at announcement,
perhaps because it was unprecedented and its success therefore uncertain (cf. Glasserman & Wang,
2011; Kelly, Lustig, & Van Nieuwerburgh, 2011).
As noted in Table 3 (Panel D),weﬁnd a signiﬁcantmarket reaction for four event dates for insurance
companies: Investors view D2, D3, and D4 as negative events by investors (signiﬁcant at the 5% level).
Again, similar to our ﬁndings for banks and S&Ls, only one event, D5, is positive for the sub-group
of insurance companies. D2 (2/13/2008) marks the passage of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008,
one of the ﬁrst of several economic stimulus attempts to avert a recession and bolster the economy.
This act, passed by President George W. Bush, was treated as a catalyst to a weak economy, and
largely included tax breaks for businesses and payments to select groups of low- and middle-income
taxpayers, who were expected to spend it and help revive the economy. The market perception of
the probability of the latter was mixed; hence, the stock market reaction is found to be only marginal
in signiﬁcance. As mentioned earlier, D3 reﬂects the date of the SEC ban on short-selling of ﬁnancial
company stock. Unlike the sample of banks, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant reaction in the insurance sector
to the passage of either TARP or ARRA, two of the most controversial pieces of legislation during the
crisis period. Because these two bills were largely for the beneﬁt of banks, it appears that the market
perceived them as minimally beneﬁcial to insurance companies. D4 marks the passage of the Housing
and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), which was intended to address issues relating to the mortgage
market, speciﬁcally the sub-prime crisis. HERA allowed the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) to work
with at-risk borrowers to reﬁnance into more affordable government-insured mortgages. HERA also
injected capital into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and led to government conservatorship of these
two institutions.
Finally, as reported in Panel E of Table 3, we ﬁnd a negative market reaction of REITs for ﬁve of
the nine events: D3, D4, D7, D8, and D9. D3, D4, D7, and D8 are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, D9 at the
5% level. The ban on naked short-selling (D3) is also viewed as a negative event for REITs, albeit less
signiﬁcantly so than for the other sub-groups of ﬁrms. Themarket reaction of REITs is similar to that of
banks for the dates D7, D8, and D9. D4 is signiﬁcantly negative for REITs. A substantial portion of HERA
(D4) deals with helping families to avoid foreclosure by providing loans wherein lenders take deep
discounts (Page, 2008, p. 252). The program was available only to owner-occupants, not to investors;
hence, the market did not see this as beneﬁcial for REITs.
In summary, Hypothesis H01, which posits no abnormal market reaction for the announcement
period returns, is not supported. 8 For the overall sample of ﬁrms, eight of the nine events have abnor-
mal returns that are signiﬁcantly different from zero. Three of the sub-groups report more negative
7 We investigate whether the positive reaction to TARP is simply a compensation to the negative reaction to the attempt to
pass TARP on 9/29/08 by examining the event window that date. Both event dates 9/29 and 10/3 result in a positive abnormal
return for banks. Thus, it appears that banks reacted less negatively than the overall market to both versions of TARP.
8 In order to disentangle themarket expectation versus the actual market reaction, we examine the run-up prior to the event
date, using a run-up window of 10 days for most of our events. We ﬁnd an opposing run-up for only three events. Overall,
             
                
               
               
               
               
                
                 
              
         
               
                
                 
               
                
                
               
        
           
                  
                  
              
              
              
                
                   
               
    
                
               
                
              
                   
               
                 
             
                
                
           
              
                 
               
                  
                  
                      
    
events than positive, and it appears that the markets do not welcome government interventions,
despite the intent of these measures to help the ﬁrms via economic stimuli. Banks reports the high-
est number of negative events (six), followed by REITs, which report ﬁve negative events. Thus, it
appears that the market is penalizing the two segments most closely associated with the crisis: the
banking industry and the real estate industry. The passage of HERA, allowing for the government con-
servatorship of the mortgage ﬁnance giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, is viewed as a signiﬁcantly
negative event for REITs. D3, the date the SEC announced a ban on short-selling of ﬁnancial company
stock, is viewed negatively by our overall sample and by all four of the industry sub-groups. Banks and
insurance companies report only one positive event; REITs, as a group, report no signiﬁcantly positive
reaction to any of the government interventions during this period.
We also report the F-tests for signiﬁcance to examine difference inmarket reaction among the four
sub-industry groups in Table 3. A perusal of the F-test statistics shows that the market reaction for
D3, D4, D5, D7, and D9 are signiﬁcantly different (at the 1% level) among our four groups, while D8
is marginally different among the industry groups. Thus, we do not ﬁnd support for Hypothesis H02,
which predicts that the abnormal returns are not different among the four groups of ﬁrms. We also
examine differences in reaction based on size. We ﬁnd that the same events are signiﬁcant for both
small and large ﬁrms, although the smaller ﬁrms show higher signiﬁcance levels than larger ﬁrms for
some of these events (not reported in a table).9
5.2. Change in systematic risk (risk shifts) during- and post-crisis: Hypothesis H03
Table 4 reports the overall results for all events as measured by the variable D10, as well as the
post-event shift in the alpha and beta for the entire sample and for each group of ﬁrms based on
Model 1 for announcement effects and risk shifts, as described in the methodology section. Overall,
themarket viewed the government interventions during theﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009 as badnews.
An examination of the alpha (constant) shows that post-event alpha is negative and highly signiﬁcant
for the full sample of 602 ﬁrms. Similarly, post-event beta shift is positive and highly signiﬁcant for
all ﬁrms. The pre-crisis beta for all ﬁrms is 0.7776; beta is higher by 0.2055 during and by 0.2166 after
the crisis. Thus, the cumulative effects of the governmental actions are increase in risk and decrease
in value for our sample.
On the individual industrygroup level,weﬁndsimilar results for our sampleof banks. Theaggregate
event abnormal returns (D10) are negative andhighly signiﬁcant. The alpha for this group changes from
positive to negative and is highly signiﬁcant. The beta increases during the event, as does the post-
event beta, indicating that the interventions were not risk-reducing events for banks. We ﬁnd that
the S&Ls, as a group, do not demonstrate much in terms of pre- and post-event shifts, and we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant change in alphas or betas, while the cumulative event window return, D10, is negative and
marginally signiﬁcant. For the insurance industry,wedonotﬁnda signiﬁcant shift in the alphaafter the
crisis, while the cumulative abnormal return, D10, is negative and highly signiﬁcant. An examination
of the shift in beta, during- and post-event, shows that the intervening actions ensuing from the crisis
appear to be risk-increasing events for this industry. Finally, we ﬁnd that for our sample of REITS,
both during- and post-event beta increases signiﬁcantly,while post-event alpha decreasesmarginally.
Once again, the aggregate abnormal return (D10) during the crisis is negative and highly signiﬁcant.
Thus, we do not ﬁnd support for H03, that systematic risk remains the same during and after the
crisis. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in the risk shifts observed during and after the ﬁnancial market
crisis.
our results suggest that the market views the interventions as negative events and not as negative surprises after positive
expectations.
9 As a robustness check, we re-estimate all the regressions using a 255-day pre-event window. While there is a marginal
change in the level of signiﬁcance of three coefﬁcients (out of the 18 signiﬁcant coefﬁcients), there is no change in the sign of
the coefﬁcient for these dates.
             
   
   
      
 
    
     
             
  
 
      
       
        
   
     
  
      
      
       
        
 
     
   
      
      
       
        
    
     
  
      
      
       
        
   
     
      
   
      
                      
                 
                    
                          
            
       
      
      
      
  
            
       
               
             
             
Table 4
Regression estimates for portfolios of all ﬁrms and by type of Financial Institution.
Panel A: all ﬁrms
Constant BETA All events
Variable Intercept Post alpha S&P return Post event During event D10
Coefﬁcient 0.0006 −0.0008 0.7796 0.2166 0.2055 −0.0042
p-value 0 0.0003 − 0 0 0
Signiﬁcance *** *** *** *** *** ***
R-sq =0.1415 No. of Obs =364,729 Pr > F=0.0001 Signiﬁcance ***
Panel B: banks
Coefﬁcient 0.0005 −0.0012 0.6916 0.1804 0.1759 −0.0044
Error 0.0001 0.0003 0.0259 0.035 0.0266 0.0007
t Value 3.73 −3.94 26.7 5.16 6.62 −6.53
Pr > |t| 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Signiﬁcance *** *** *** *** *** ***
R-sq 0.1101 No. of Obs =331
Panel C: S&Ls
Coefﬁcient 0.0002 −0.0005 0.4581 0.0769 0.0704 −0.0025
Error 0.0003 0.0007 0.0575 0.0777 0.059 0.0015
t Value 0.62 −0.66 7.96 0.99 1.19 −1.68
Pr > |t| 0.533 0.5077 <.0001 0.3221 0.2329 0.0936
Signiﬁcance *** *
R-sq 0.0456 No. of Obs =67
Panel D: insurance companies
Coefﬁcient 0.0008 0.0001 0.9665 0.1738 0.1972 −0.0026
Error 0.0002 0.0005 0.0399 0.0539 0.0409 0.001
t Value 4.18 0.19 24.2 3.22 4.84 −2.49
Pr > |t| <.0001 0.8486 <.0001 0.0013 <.0001 0.0127
Signiﬁcance *** *** *** *** **
R-sq 0.2317 No. of Obs =105
Panel E: REITs
Coefﬁcient 0.0013 −0.0006 1.0555 0.4771 0.4049 −0.0063
Error 0.0002 0.0006 0.0468 0.0631 0.0479 0.0012
t Value 5.67 −1 22.57 7.56 8.45 −5.25
Pr > |t| <.0001 0.3186 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Signiﬁcance *** *** *** *** ***
R-sq 0.2675 No. of Obs =100
F-test for comparing coefﬁcients among the four
types of ﬁnancial institutions
Wald 75.39 Pr >Chi Sq <.0001
Signiﬁcance ***
rjt =portfolio return for day t; aj = constant prior to event period; a1 j = constant prior to event period; rmt =S&P 500 Index return;
bj = coefﬁcient representing beta; b1 j = coefﬁcient representing a shift in beta during the event period; b1 1 j = coefﬁcient repre-
senting a shift in beta after the event period;D0 =dummy variable equal to 1 during the event period; DP = dummy variable
equal to 1 after event period; Dik =dummy variable equal to 1 on the day prior to and the day of event I; Ckj = coefﬁcient of the
information dummy variable k for portfolio j; ejt =error term for portfolio j.
rj,t = aj + a1 j DP +bj rmt +b1 j D0 rmt +b1 1 DP rmt +Ckj Dik + ejt
*** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
* Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
5.3. Cross-sectional results
We examine the determinants of D10 (cumulative abnormal returns for all events) and report
cross-sectional results for our sample in Table 5.
Wehad hypothesized that ﬁrm size, auditor quality (Big 8 auditor), ROE, non-U.S. ﬁrms, and trading
volume would be positively related to abnormal returns for the event windows. Our cross-sectional
results show that non-U.S. ﬁrms earn marginally signiﬁcantly higher abnormal returns over the crisis
       
      
      
 
     
    
 
 
    
    
     
 
    
   
   
                 
                        
                         
                       
                           
                    
      
         
 
      
      
      
                
                 
                
                  
               
             
                 
               
                 
             
              
       
            
             
                
            
              
        
                
        
               
                 
             
                 
              
                
                    
Table 5
Cross-sectional regressions of determinants of abnormal returns.
Dependent variable: all event abnormal returns (D10)
Independent variable Coefﬁcient Standard error t Value Pr > |t| Signiﬁcance
Intercept 0.0074 0.0021 3.52 0.0005 ***
Ln Size 0.0001 0.0003 0.32 0.7468
Big8 −0.0017 0.0010 −1.65 0.0996 *
Debt Ratio −0.0051 0.0017 −3.02 0.0026 ***
Other OTC −0.0461 0.0114 −4.03 <.0001 ***
ROE 0.0013 0.0026 0.49 0.6251
Banker −0.0008 0.0011 −0.75 0.4536
Non US 0.0053 0.0021 2.49 0.0131 **
Lnvol −0.0010 0.0002 −3.94 <.0001 ***
Size*OTC 0.0067 0.0016 4.29 <.0001 ***
R-sq Adj R-sq F-Value Pr > F Signiﬁcance
0.1008 0.0869 7.26 <.0001 ***
This table provides the cross-sectional regression estimates. The dependent variable, D10, is the total of the abnormal returns
for all events, estimated for the event period. Ln Size is the total assets of the ﬁrm, Big 8 Auditor is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the ﬁrm uses a Big 8 Auditor, Debt Ratio is the debt-to-assets ratio of the ﬁrm, Other OTC is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the ﬁrm is listed as Other OTC (Compustat Exchange 19), ROE is ﬁrm Return on Equity, Banker is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is a bank, non-U.S. is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is a non-U.S. ﬁrm, Ln Trading Volume is
monthly trading volume from CRSP, Size*OTC is an interaction variable for ﬁrm size and exchange type. All values are for the
ﬁscal year ending prior to September, 2007.
D10 =ˇ0 +ˇ1Sizej +ˇ2BigAuditorj +ˇ3DebtRatioj +ˇ4OtherOTCj +ˇ5ROEj +ˇ6NonUSj +ˇ7LnVolumej +ˇ8Size*OtherOTCj +
ˇ9Bankj +u1
*** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
** Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
* Indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
period. While we believed that the presence of a Big 8 audit ﬁrm would positively impact abnormal
returns, we ﬁnd that such a presence leads tomarginally lower abnormal returns for the ﬁrms.We had
also predicted a positive relation between ﬁrm leverage and abnormal returns; but we do not ﬁnd this
for the sample.However,wemayhave obtained this result in part becauseweuse of only balance sheet
items to measure debt, and we do not use off-balance sheet derivatives information in our calculation
of leverage.Weﬁnd that ﬁrmswith higher debt-to-total-assets ratio earn signiﬁcantly lower abnormal
returns (at the 1% level), in line with the franchise value argument of Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti
(2006): that more efﬁcient ﬁrms choose lower leverage (higher capital) to protect their value and any
hint of liquidation. Our results do not show that ﬁrm size or ﬁrm performance, as measured by ROE,
impacts the event-period abnormal returns in any signiﬁcant manner. We had predicted that ﬁrms
that trade on smaller exchanges (other OTC) will earn signiﬁcantly lower abnormal returns over the
crisis legislative events; our results verify this prediction.
Although we had hypothesized a positive relation between trading volume and abnormal return,
our results document the opposite. Firms with higher trading volume earn signiﬁcantly lower abnor-
mal returns over our eventwindows.We had also hypothesized that larger ﬁrms that trade on smaller
exchanges (Size*Non OTC) would earn signiﬁcantly lower abnormal returns. However, we report a
positive coefﬁcient for this interaction variable. It appears that larger ﬁrms on the smaller exchanges
are relatively sheltered from the effects of the crisis.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results for the cross-sectional determinants of risk shift during the
period of the governmental interventions (Beta Shift During Event).
Wehadhypothesizedapositive relationbetween size, debt to total assets, otherOTC, bankingﬁrms,
and Size*Other OTC. We ﬁnd that risk shift during the crisis period is very signiﬁcantly related to ﬁrm
size, and bigger ﬁrms experienced signiﬁcantly higher increases in systematic risk, as measured by
the beta. This result is consistentwith Black andHazelwood (2012), who note increases in loan risk for
large bank recipients of TARP. We also ﬁnd that more leveraged ﬁrms experienced marginal increases
in risk during the crisis. We had also posited non-U.S. ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher trading volume
would be less risky. Our results show this to be true for non-U.S. ﬁrms, and we ﬁnd that the change in
            
           
    
 
    
  
 
 
    
  
  
 
  
    
                      
                          
                      
                         
                      
                   
           
   
      
      
      
                
                
                  
               
                   
                 
             
               
                 
 
               
                  
              
                
             
              
                 
          
 
              
             
                    
            
                 
               
                
                 
Table 6
Cross-sectional determinants of risk shift This table provides the cross-sectional regression estimates.
Dependent variable Panel A: beta shift during event Panel B: beta shift post event
Independent variable Coefﬁcient p-value Signiﬁcance Coefﬁcient p-value Signiﬁcance
Intercept −0.3795 0.0002 *** −0.2430 0.0761 *
Ln Size 0.0734 <.0001 *** 0.0505 0.0239 **
Big 8 Auditor 0.0531 0.2812 0.1033 0.1191
Debt Ratio 0.1442 0.0789 * 0.2068 0.0611 *
OtherOTC 0.0400 0.9423 0.0791 0.9153
ROE −0.1054 0.4020 −0.1811 0.2846
NonUS −0.3832 0.0002 *** −0.3778 0.0065 ***
LnVol −0.0028 0.8163 −0.0017 0.9162
Size*OTC −0.0042 0.9553 −0.0258 0.7993
Bank −0.1137 0.0356 ** −0.1363 0.0611 *
R-sq =0.0756 R-sq =0.0303
The dependent variable, D10, is the total of the abnormal returns for all events, estimated for the event period. Ln Size is the
total assets of the ﬁrm, Big 8 Auditor is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm uses a Big 8 Auditor, Debt Ratio is the
debt-to-assets ratio of the ﬁrm, Other OTC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is listed as Other OTC (Compustat
Exchange 19), ROE is ﬁrm Return on Equity, Banker is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is a bank, Non-U.S. is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is a non-U.S. ﬁrm, Ln Trading Volume is monthly trading volume from CRSP, Size*OTC is an
interaction variable for ﬁrm size and exchange type. All values are for the ﬁscal year ending prior to September 2007.
Beta shift (during/post) =ˇ0 +ˇ1Sizej +ˇ2Big8Auditorj +ˇ3DebtRatioj +ˇ4OtherOTCj +ˇ5ROEj +ˇ6NonUSj +ˇ7TradingVolumej +
ˇ8Size*OtherOTC+ˇ9Bankj +uj
*** Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
** Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
* Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
systematic risk during the eventwindows is signiﬁcantly lower for non-U.S. ﬁrms (at the 1% level). The
coefﬁcient for the banking ﬁrm dummy (Banks) shows that banks had a lower shift in systematic risk
during the crisis event period. As documented in the business press, the focus in the initial days of the
crisis was around TBTF, and speciﬁcally large banks and the riskiness of their operations.We therefore
divide our banks into quintiles based on bank size to examine the impact of size on the shift of risk,
controlling for the other industry sub-groups (not shown in a table). Our results show that banks in the
top quintile show signiﬁcantly higher increases in risk during this period, demonstrating the higher
risk proﬁles of the larger banks. Thus, the cross-sectional results reported in Table 6—that banks have
a lower increase in risk–appears to be driven by the smaller banks in our sample, controlling for size,
leverage, etc.
We report the cross-sectional impacts on risk shift after the crisis (Beta Shift Post-Event) in Panel
B of Table 6. Our results are similar to those reported for the determinants of risk shift during the
crisis; we ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms and more leveraged ﬁrms experience increases in systematic risk,
while non-U.S. ﬁrms and banks experience lower shifts in beta. Our results do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
relation between auditor quality, other OTC, trading volume, ROE, and changes in systematic risk.
While we could not show that banking ﬁrms earned signiﬁcantly lower abnormal returns during the
event windows, our analysis of the shift in beta shows that banking ﬁrms do have a smaller increase
in systematic risk compared with the other groups in the sample.
6. Conclusion
We examine the differential market reaction of ﬁnancial services ﬁrms to a series of government
interventions passed in response to the ﬁnancial market crisis of 2007–2009. While recent research
examines the impact of a single event, to thebest of our knowledge, our study is theﬁrst to examine the
impact of interventions in a multi-event framework over the 2007–2009 crisis period. Furthermore,
while most of the research focuses on banks, our study is wider in scope and investigates the differ-
ential impacts of the nine chosen governmental interventions on banks as well as on S&Ls, insurance
companies, and REITS, for changes in both returns and risks. Our inclusion of these industry groups is
drivenby the fact that theﬁnancial crisiswas closely linked to thehousingmarket crisis, thusproviding
             
           
        
             
            
                 
                 
            
                
                  
               
                  
                  
                
               
       
             
             
               
             
            
            
                   
      
             
                    
             
                    
  
                   
           
                    
                  
                  
                 
          
                
                    
   
                     
       
                  
    
                     
   
                     
      
                   
           
                
   
                   
        
                  
                
  
                       
       
a framework in which to investigate how other ﬁnancial institutions were differentially impacted by
various governmental interventions. We also examine the cross-sectional determinants of both the
abnormal returns and risk shifts around the crisis period.
Using SUR estimations, we investigatemarket reaction in aggregate and separately for banks, S&Ls,
insurance companies, and REITs for economic stimuli and ﬁnancial stability intervention events. In
addition, we examine pre- and post-event shifts in alphas and betas for the ﬁrms in our sample. We
ﬁnd that, on average, the event date market reaction is negative and signiﬁcant for all ﬁrms in our
sample for seven of the nine government intervention events. The aggregate event-date abnormal
returns,D10, are signiﬁcantly negative for our overall sample. For the overall sample, we ﬁnd that only
one date – October 3, 2008 (passage of the TARP Act) – results in a positive market reaction. Parsing
downby industry sub-group,weﬁnd that crisis hits thebanking industry thehardest; investor reaction
for event dates is negative for ﬁve of the nine event dates for our sample of banks. Interestingly, we
ﬁnd that D5, marking the passage of TARP, is a positive event for all sub-groups except for REITs. Our
results also demonstrate a negative post-event shift in alpha for the ﬁrms in our sample, along with
an overall increased shift in beta. Upon further parsing, we ﬁnd that the interventions are systematic
risk-increasing events for banks, insurance companies, and REITs.
Our cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the abnormal returns for all event windows
shows that leveraged ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher trading volumes earn signiﬁcantly lower event-
period abnormal returns. We also ﬁnd that non-U.S. ﬁrms appear to be relatively sheltered from the
impact of the intervening events, perhaps because of diversiﬁcation. Turning to the determinants of
systematic risk shifts during- and post-crisis, we document that larger ﬁrms experience signiﬁcantly
higher increases in beta, while non-U.S. ﬁrms report lower changes in systematic risk.
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